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Abstract—Existing automated attack-generation algorithms for
machine learning models for computer vision tend to focus on
digital attacks within an -ball around the input in white-box and
black-box settings. However, in the real world, a more interesting
class of attacks are those that are physically-realizable – say, by
placing unobtrusive stickers on a traffic sign to cause a change
in its classification. Given a model, generating such attacks
automatically is still a challenge, even in white-box settings. We
present GRAPHITE, an algorithm to automatically find small
areas to place robust adversarial perturbations in the black-
box hard-label setting where the attacker only has access to
the model prediction class label. Unlike algorithms for digital
attacks that only aim to minimize perturbation based on an Lp
norm (typically L2 or L∞), the proposed algorithm automatically
generates robust adversarial examples that (1) have a high success
rate under multiple transformations that simulate, for example,
viewing point changes and (2) occupy a small area on the image
so that they are more likely to be physically realizable as stickers.
Using GRAPHITE, we successfully attack a stop sign to be
misclassified as a speed limit 30 km/hr sign in 92.86% of physical
test images with fewer than 124k queries.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) models, such as deep-neural net-
works (DNNs), have had resounding success in several sce-
narios such as face and object recognition [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].
However, researchers have discovered that these ML models
are vulnerable to several adversarial attacks, such as test-time,
training-time, and backdoor attacks [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11].
For a comprehensive tutorial on adversarial ML readers should
consult [12]. These attacks have raised concerns for deploying
these models in critical settings, such as autonomous driving,
security, and cyber-physical systems (CPSs).
In this paper we consider physical attacks in the black-box
hard-label setting. These attacks fall under a broader class of
test-time attacks, in which an adversary crafts an adversarial
example by perturbing a benign image that causes a misclas-
sification by a ML model. In digital adversarial examples,
adversary’s goal is for the perturbed image and the benign
image to look the same to a human. For physical adversarial
attacks (the topic of this paper), adversary’s goal is two fold:
(1) Make a change to a small area of the object, e.g., place
some stickers on the object; and (2) for the resulting perturbed
image to survive physical transformations (e.g. perturbed stop
sign should appear as a speed limit sign from various angles
and distances). Even though a growing body of recent work
has focused on creating robust physical adversarial examples,
where an attacker manufactures a physical object with special
perturbations [13], [14] or modifies existing objects with
manufactured elements such as stickers [15], [16], [17], there
are two limitations of current approaches. First, the existing
body of work assumes access to a white-box model where
gradient information is available [14], [15]. Second, finding
good candidates for robust physical attacks still requires a
fair amount of hand-crafting, e.g., identifying a good area in
the image to apply a perturbation and then searching for an
optimal perturbation.
We address both limitations in our novel algorithm,
GRAPHITE (Gradient-free Robust Adversarial Physical Hard-
label Image-based Targeted Examples). GRAPHITE assumes
a hard-label threat model that more closely mirrors real-world
deployments of ML [18] — many commercial or proprietary
systems are closed source, and only provide answers to predic-
tion queries. GRAPHITE also proposes a multi-objective op-
timization formulation of the problem that addresses the twin
objectives of perturbing only a small, but unknown, fraction of
an image and making the perturbation misclassify to a desired
target label with a high degree of robustness to viewpoint and
lighting changes. As far as we are aware, GRAPHITE is the
first algorithm that meets both these objectives. GRAPHITE
also does not require access to the training dataset. To find
adversarial images, it only requires access to the image to be
attacked and an example target image.
The closest approach to ours is the recent work on digi-
tal (non-physical) hard-label attacks [18], [19], [20] that, in
general, attempt to find a digital adversarial example that
is within a small distance from the victim image by doing
gradient-free optimization. We experimentally found that these
adversarial examples neither have small perturbation areas
nor have resiliency to viewing point changes. We found that
a radically different approach to optimization is required
to generate robust physical perturbations. One of the key
innovations in our work is to jointly find a minimal mask and
physically robust perturbation in an optimization formulation.
This formulation is then solved using a combination of a
greedy reduction algorithm to automatically find a viable and
small patch area and gradient-free optimization techniques to
optimize the patch for increased robustness to physical world
variation such as viewpoint changes.
GRAPHITE is designed to generate candidate adversarial
patches for images that can be used to simulate physical
perturbation attacks on objects such as traffic signs. Similar
to Eykholt et al. [15], we did field testing of several attacks
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Fig. 1: Targeted GTSRB attack to convert a stop sign into a
speed limit 30 km/hr sign, generated by GRAPHITE.
by creating adversarial perturbation stickers, put them on real
objects, and measured the success rate of the attack under
different angles and distances in lab and drive-by tests. In
general, we found that the adversarial attacks identified by
GRAPHITE worked well in the real-world. For example, we
printed out and applied a candidate adversarial patch generated
by GRAPHITE to a real stop sign and found that the stop sign
was detected as a speed limit 30 km/hr sign 92.86% of the time
under varying viewpoints and lighting conditions.
Generating adversarial images with GRAPHITE currently
takes about several minutes. Nevertheless, an advantage of
GRAPHITE over prior work is that it is fully automatic, with
no intermediate manual steps in generating small adversarial
patches that are designed to be resilient to viewpoint changes.
Designing such algorithms that are fully automated and do not
require hand-crafting is important for being able to incorpo-
rate the attack-generation algorithms into adversarial training
algorithms to help defend against physical perturbation attacks.
Fig. 1 shows an example GTSRB attack.
Our Contributions:
• We introduce, to the best of our knowledge, the first hard-
label algorithm for creating candidate physical adversarial
examples. As far as we are aware, GRAPHITE is the first
algorithm that automatically finds both small masks and
achieves high robustness to environmental transforms in
either white-box or black-box settings.
• We provide a formulation of a joint optimization prob-
lem across masks and robustness of the classification to
environmental transforms. We show that the problem is
computationally hard. We present algorithms to address
it and include theoretical analysis of the algorithms.
• We evaluate GRAPHITE on multiple (victim, target) pairs
on the GTSRB dataset and found that it succeeded in
finding perturbations with both small mask area and high
robustness, based on expectation over transforms (EOT)
metrics proposed by Athalye et al. [14]. We also confirm
the robustness of attacks in physical settings by applying
stickers to a stop sign, as suggested by GRAPHITE, using
the evaluation methodology of Eykholt et al. [15].
II. BACKGROUND
We discuss our threat model and background information
on attack algorithms.
A. Threat Model
We focus on hard-label, decision-based attacks in the physi-
cal world. We assume the attacker can only access the classifi-
cation output (i.e., the highest confidence class label) without
any confidence information. This type of threat model is most
relevant to CPSs, where an attacker can easily obtain query
access to the ML models without having to spend extra effort
to reverse engineer a full neural network. Furthermore, we
assume that the attacker can modify the physical appearance
of a target object by placing stickers on it.
B. Adversarial Attacks in White-Box settings
Szegedy et al. [6] showed that small imperceptible perturba-
tions δ on an input x can be found that lead to misclassification
of deep neural networks. Such small perturbations can be au-
tomatically determined by solving the following optimization
problem:
argminδ∈S ν(δ)
F (θ, x+ δ) = yadv
where S is allowed perturbation space, ν is an appropriate
norm, F is the classifier, θ are the model parameters, and yadv
is the adversary’s desired target label (we assume a targeted
attack). If the model parameters are clear from the context, we
will simply write the classifier’s output on x as F (x). In white-
box settings, given a model with parameters θ, a perturbed
input can be computed using gradient information. Several
targeted attacks exist in the literature [12].
C. Adversarial Attacks in Soft-label Black-Box Settings
If white-box access to the model is not available, then it
is not straightforward to compute the gradient ∇xL(θ, x, y),
since the adversary does not have access to the model F (θ, x).
One approach is to instead use score-based techniques that rely
on the access to the softmax layer output in addition to the
final class labels [21], [22]. Zeroth-order gradient estimation
techniques are then used to estimate the gradient. In particular,
the softmax layer output is used to estimate the change in loss
on a set of random perturbations around x, which can then be
used to estimate the gradient [21], [22].
D. Adversarial Attacks in Hard-label Black-box Settings
A recent line of work has started exploring hard-label
attacks in the digital setting [18], [19], [20], [23] in which the
adversary has access to neither the soft labels nor the model
– the only access is to the top-1 label. Hard-label settings
are more challenging for an adversary because hard labels
create a discontinuous optimization space – most perturbations
will likely simply return the same label and thus it becomes
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difficult to figure out the best direction in which to do the
perturbation. Thus, zeroth order gradient estimation used in
soft-label black-box settings fails.
Cheng et al. introduced the algorithm OPT-attack [18] to
address the discontinuous optimization space problem. Let
x refer to a victim image that we, as attackers, wish to be
classified by the model F as an image in the target class yadv .
The perturbation that causes this classification change can be
thought of as an adversarial direction φ. OPT-attack aims to
find the perturbation direction φ that has the least distance
to the decision boundary. Let λ refer to a scaling factor and
let g(φ) be the scalar distance to nearest adversarial example
in the direction φ. Formally, this leads to the following
optimization problem:
min
φ
g(φ) (1)
where the objective g(φ) is defined as:
min
λ>0
λ s.t.
(
F
(
x+ λ
φ
||φ||2
)
= yadv
)
(2)
In [18], the attacker initializes φ to be the minimal pixel-
wise difference between the starting image x and a random
target class image from the training set. Note that OPT-attack
requires a valid target example for proper initialization and
then works towards reducing the distance from the original
image. Generally, OPT-attack is set up to generate and update
noise in the dimension of the model input, which matches the
training set and initial attack images.
Once φ has been initialized from an example target class
image, OPT-attack finds g(φ) by doing a binary search in
the direction φ to find the nearest point around which the
decision flips from the victim to the target. Once one g(φ) is
found, the algorithm proceeds to find other decision boundary
points in nearby directions to optimize g(φ) with zeroth-order
optimization. Specifically, Cheng et al. [18] use the Random-
ized Gradient Free (RGF) method [24], [25], though other
zero-order methods can also be used to estimate the gradient.
At a high-level, the algorithm samples nearby directions and
uses that to estimate a gradient to use in the optimization.
The gradient update is defined as an average of q gradient
calculations gˆ, where
gˆ =
g(φ+ βu)− g(φ)
β
· u (3)
In the above equation, u is a normalized, random Gaussian
vector and β is a nonzero smoothing parameter.
E. Robust Physical Perturbation Attacks
Prior work has shown that standard digital adversarial
examples fail to be robust under environmental variations [26],
[27]. Athalye et al. introduced the idea of environmental
transforms to account for varying conditions such as the
distance and angle of the camera, lighting conditions, etc. and
recommended changing the objective function to maximize
the robustness across the space of environmental transforms
[14]. Consider a distribution of environmental transforms T
that transform x to alternative viewpoints or to different
lighting conditions under which we aim to achieve robustness.
Then, the revised optimization objective, given a model to be
attacked with parameters θ, is as follows:
argmin
δ∈S
ν(δ) + Et∼T
[
F (θ, t(x+ δ)) 6= yadv
]
(4)
The expected value of loss under the full space of possible
transformations is challenging to determine. Athalye et al.
referred to this average loss value as EOT (expectation over
transforms) and estimated it by averaging loss over 40 ran-
dom digital transforms. Athalye et al. printed the adversarial
images and re-captured them with camera and confirmed that
adversarial images with high EOT values tended to have high
robustness (i.e., were misclassified) while those with low EOT
values and those generated without factoring in transforms
tended to have low robustness. Thus, EOT can serve as a
reasonable proxy to physical-world validation, which tends to
be expensive.
From now on in the paper, we will use a more descriptive
term, survivability, to refer to EOT since the goal of high
EOT is to ensure survival of classification under different
environmental conditions.
Athalye et al. [14] addressed the issue of physical robust-
ness of adversarial examples but they were not designed to
perturb existing objects in the real world. Eykholt et al. [15]
extended the EOT work to find perturbations that could be
physically realized and placed on real-world objects such
as traffic signs to cause a change in classification. A key
element to find such examples was the notion of a mask that
constrained the perturbation to a limited area of the sign and
was defined by a matrix of 0’s and 1’s of the same size as
the input image. In [15], such masks were crafted manually
and then, once a mask Mx was chosen for an input x, the
following optimization problem was solved:
argmin
δ∈S
ν(δ) + Et∼T
[
F (θ, t(x+Mx · δ)) 6= yadv
]
(5)
In contrast to digital attacks and even the work of Athalye et
al. [14], the perturbation δ itself was unconstrained, except for
it being required to be confined to the mask area Mx. Eykholt
et al. [15] did not provide a procedure for automatically
identifying a good mask Mx or for evaluating them, but they
provided some suggestions, e.g., they recommended finding
perturbations based on the l1 norm to help identify areas in
an input image that were likely to be most sensitive to changes.
Thus, even though robust physical perturbation attacks on ma-
chine learning models have been convincingly demonstrated
on some examples, actually finding good candidates for such
attacks efficiently remains an art, even in white-box settings.
As far as we are aware, there is no automated procedure
currently available.
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(a) Victim sign (b) Target sign (c) Vanilla OPT (d) Robust OPT
Fig. 2: Results from OPT on a targeted attack from stop
sign (a) to a German 30 speed limit sign (b). Adversarial
image (c) from vanilla OPT has poor survivability under digital
environmental transforms. Adversarial image (d) is generated
by OPT after incorporating a 80% expected survivability under
transforms goal, but has obvious artifacts from the target
image. Both adversarial images would be hard to use in the
physical world without covering or replacing an entire sign.
F. Initial Strawman Approach
We tried vanilla OPT to do a targeted attack to convert
a stop sign (Fig. 2a) to a German speed limit 30 km/hr sign
(Fig. 2b) in the GTSRB dataset. The result is shown in Fig. 2c.
The attack results in modification of over 90% of the pixels
and has less than 1% digital survivability under environmen-
tal transforms (transforms used to measure survivability are
discussed later in Experiments).
We then incorporated Athalye’s EOT (survivability) mea-
sure into the optimization by defining a wrapper function F’(x)
as follows, aiming for 80% survivability:
F ′(x) =
y if Et∼T
[
F
(
t(x+ δ)
)
= y
]
≥ 80%
−1 otherwise
(6)
In the above, -1 is a special value indicating that the result
has insufficient survivability. The resulting image from OPT
on optimizing the attack for F’(x) is shown in Fig. 2d. The
results in Fig. 2c and 2d can vary depending on the initial
random seed used in OPT but, in general, we found OPT
applied to F’(x) yielded poor results with significant artifacts
from the target sign visible. The problem we are addressing
in this paper is even harder since we also need to confine that
attack to a small yet-to-be-determined area of the stop sign.
We also considered manually crafting masks (as in Eykholt
et al. [15] and trying OPT in the masked region, but there
are two problems. The first one is finding a suitable mask
that results in F’(x) being the target label with the desired
survivability (e.g., 80%). Assuming that can be done (a hard
problem), OPT is still likely to exhibit target artifacts in the
mask region. As an example, using the mask from RP2 yielded
an initial survivability of less than 1% when using our stop
sign and speed limit 30 km/hr images as the victim and target
and OPT failed to initialize.
III. OPTIMIZATION FOR HARD-LABEL PHYSICAL
ATTACKS
In this section, we will describe our approach, GRAPHITE.
Unlike prior work, our goal is to both find a candidate mask
and the perturbation within that masked area so that the result-
ing image is likely to be robust when physically realized. We
will first describe a joint optimization problem for finding an
optimal perturbation and mask and then discuss our approach
to solving it in hard-label blackbox settings. As in Athalye et
al. [14], we also rely on estimating survivability of an image
under transforms, i.e., expectation of an image being predicted
with a given label under physical world transformations (this
was termed EOT in Athalye et al. [14]).
A. Problem Setup
In our approach, our goal is to find some perturbation δ and
a small mask M such that when δ is applied to a victim image
x our model F predicts the target label ith high survivability.
The area that δ may occupy is constrained by the mask M .
The perturbations must have high expected survivability under
transformations t sampled from a distribution T . To help with
initialization, we will utilize an example target image xtar.
We also introduce a general mask goodness function h(M)
that rewards masks that have configurable desirable properties,
such as masks with a guaranteed minimum survivability or
masks that have a certain shape.
B. Joint Optimization
With the notation above, we will first describe our new
joint optimization problem. The optimal noise must maximize
survivability and take up as little of the sign as possible. These
goals are in opposition and must be solved jointly to achieve
the best solution.
argmin
δ,M
λ1 · ||M ||0 + λ2 · h(M)
+ Et∼T
[
F
(
t(x+M · δ)
)
6= yadv
]
s.t. ∀iM [i] ∈ {0, 1}
(7)
We argue that solving this directly is computationally
challenging, especially in the hard-label setting. The first
reason is that finding an optimally-sized mask by itself is
a combinatorially hard problem (we include a proof in the
Appendix to show that it is NP-complete).
Secondly, we also operate in a very large discrete and dis-
continuous space when examining hard-label attacks. Some-
how, we must find a reasonable way to map the problem to
a form so that we apply gradient free methods or otherwise
optimize this space.
Given that we have established that solving the above prob-
lem of joint optimization is both combinatorially hard (due to
the notion of a mask) and difficult to characterize purely in
terms of gradients, we solve a decoupled optimization problem
and apply some heuristics to find good solutions.
IV. GRAPHITE’S TWO-STAGE APPROACH
We now describe our two-stage formulation where we first
find a good candidate mask heuristically (given that solving
the optimal problem is NP-hard; see Appendix) and then find
an optimal perturbation to put within that mask.
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A. Mask Generation Optimization Problem
We first find an optimized mask which when filled in with
the target image xtar results in a minimum specified level
of survivability. We constrain the perturbation to be fixed at
δtar = xtar −x and solve the optimization objective from (7)
under that constraint:
argmin
M
λ1 · ||M ||0 + λ2 · h(M)
+ Et∼T
[
F
(
t(x+M · δtar)
)
6= yadv
]
s.t. ∀iM [i] ∈ {0, 1}
(8)
We show how to solve this formulation heuristically using
an algorithm described in Section V-A.
B. Perturbation Generation Optimization Problem
Equipped with the mask M found by the Mask Generation
Optimization Problem, we then aim to maximize survivability
for the given mask. This is given by the last quantity in our
joint optimization problem (7) and is given by the objective
function below:
argmin
δ
Et∼T
[
F
(
t(x+M · δ) 6= yadv
)]
(9)
We note that the above is equivalent to finding a perturbation
that maximizes the survivability with respect to the target
label:
argmax
δ
Et∼T
[
F
(
t(x+M · δ) = yadv
)]
(10)
By using survivability as a measure of physical robustness,
we can leverage this function as an optimization goal we can
pursue even in the hard-label case (described in Section V-B).
Later, in Section V-C3 we provide empirical evidence to
suggest that this function has relatively low Lipschitz constants
even when approximating the expectation in (10) by averaging
over n transformations. We additionally refer to this process
as boosting the survivability, as we start with a δ with lower
survivability and attempt to boost it as high as we can.
V. GENERATING HARD-LABEL PHYSICAL ATTACKS WITH
GRAPHITE
We now describe how to solve the mask and perturbation
generation problems presented in Section IV in the hard-label
setting. For ease of algorithmic notation, given a mask M and
perturbation δ the survivability in (10) can be estimated as
follows by computing n randomly sampled transforms ti ∼ T :
S(M, δ) =
n∑
i=1
1
[
F
(
ti(x+M · δ)
)
= yadv
]
n
(11)
Fig. 3 shows the algorithm flow along with intermediate
and final results. The figure covers the mask generation and
boosting phases we will discuss next.
A. Mask Generation
We need to find a candidate mask that has good initial
survivability and small size. Boosting (described in V-B) can
take care of further improving the survivability.
We generate masks using a three stage process:
1) Heatmap Estimation
2) Coarse-grained Mask Reduction
3) Fine-grained Mask Reduction
We initialize the mask to cover the entire victim object with
the target object. We then choose a group of pixels called
a patch as a configurable input into the algorithm. In our
experiments, for 32×32 images, we chose a 4×4 square patch.
The patch serves two purposes: (1) it helps us estimate a
heatmap (i.e., which pixels contribute more to survivability)
and (2) it is used to punch holes in the mask to reduce the
number of pixels as the algorithm progresses while optimizing
the mask objective function (8). Choosing a very small patch
(e.g., 1 pixel) was not ideal from two perspectives: heatmap
estimation was less effective because removing a single pixel
has minimal impact on survivability and punching 1-pixel
holes makes it harder to eventually print out the final image
and cut holes in it for physical realization. A 4×4 square patch
in pixels corresponded to roughly 4”×4” square on a physical
30” stop sign. In principle, any other patch shape could have
been used, potentially giving additional attack images.
1) Heatmap Estimation: We begin by estimating the impact
of removing one patch at a time at each possible position
in the initial mask and then measuring the resulting target’s
survivability. If the survivability remains high after patch
removal, those pixels are likely unimportant to inducing a
target prediction. In contrast, the more the survivability drops,
the more important the patch area is to inducing a target
prediction.
In general, the heatmap is a function of the point at which
it is estimated. For instance, Fig. 4a shows the heatmap with
respect to the target and Fig. 4b shows the heatmap relative to
the victim (we measure the heatmap by adding a patch in the
latter case and measuring the drop in survivability with respect
the stop sign – survivability of the target label tended to remain
0 and not sufficiently interesting. In principle, the heatmap
could be measured at multiple points during the algorithm, but
the measurement is expensive in terms of number of queries
and computation time. Empirically, we found that just using
one heatmap (in our case, the target one) worked well in
practice. The white area in Fig. 4a is interesting – it suggests
that area is likely to be crucial for applying a patch in order
to convert the stop sign to the speed limit 30 km/hr sign.
Conversely, darker areas in Fig. 4a are good candidates for
elimination from the mask.
2) Coarse-grained Mask Reduction: Utilizing the informa-
tion in the heatmap (assumed to be relative to the target as
shown in Fig. 4a), we want to begin reducing the size of
the mask. The reduce algorithm first sorts all the patches
for each position in the heatmap in decreasing order of
survivability (i.e., from least impactful to most impactful).
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Heatmap 
Estimation
(Sec. V.A.1)
Fine-grained 
Reduction
(Sec. V.A.3)
Coarse-grained 
Reduction
(Sec. V.A.2)
Mask Generation
Perturbation 
Generation 
(Sec. V.B)
Victim Image (x)
Target Image (xtar)
Output Image
(x + M • δ)
Fig. 3: Figure showing the algorithm flow with intermediate and final results for a a targeted attack on a stop sign to 30 speed
limit sign.
(a) Heatmap with respect to the
target (30 speed limit sign)
(b) Heatmap with respect the
victim (stop sign
Fig. 4: Example heatmaps.
Thus, the lighter regions in Fig. 4a will appear later in the
sorted list. As an optimization to save queries, we do a coarse-
grained pruning initially. We posit that the order of patches
from least impactful to most impactful is highly reflective of
the probability of inclusion of these patches in the final mask.
Thus, we initially do a fast reduction of our mask through
binary search. Specifically, we find the point in the ordered
queue of patches P such that the bitwise union of all of
patches with greater impact yields a mask of survivability
≥ shi, where shi is a high threshold that must be hit in
the initialization and is a hyper-parameter. If shi cannot be
reached, we simply include all patches. Compared to starting
with the full object covering mask and reducing patches one
by one, this initialization process allows us to cut out the low
impact patches faster and in a coarse-grained manner.
3) Fine-grained Mask Reduction: We then execute a fine-
grained reduction that uses a greedy algorithm to improve
the objective score of (8). The algorithm starts from low
impact patches (i.e, low impact on target survivability) to more
impactful patches and greedily removes patches if it improves
the objective function. Conceptually, this objective function
can be anything that rewards smaller masks and penalizes
low survivability. We propose the base objective (or scoring
function) from (8) where h(M) is simply a Boolean constraint
that imposes a high penalty for survivability below the low
threshold slo (a hyper-parameter) and does nothing otherwise.
We will discuss other objective functions in Section VII,
but suggest that functions rewarding or penalizing certain
characteristics or the mask (e.g. a minimum survivability,
minimum size, or shape constraint) could be used instead. We
let the overall objective function in (8) be referred to as a mask
score function J .
An interesting question is whether the fine-grained approach
is even required. We later show in experimental results that
coarse-grained reduction by itself does not produce good
results (it leads to significantly larger masks). Score-based
pruning generally requires queries to measure survivability
since that is one of the factors in the score. One likely reason
fine-grained reduction helps is that the initial heatmap is not
necessarily perfectly accurate as the mask is pruned.
A future direction is to explore other heuristics other than
greedy. We considered hill-climbing algorithm as a potential
alternative in which we make multiple passes over the list
of remaining patches and try to apply them until no further
patches can be applied to improve the score. This guarantees
a local minimum (since the problem is likely non-convex), but
significantly increases the query cost since testing each patch
application for survivability, which is needed to evaluate the
score, involves n queries (see Equation 11). Empirically, we
found greedy approach to provide satisfactory solutions.
Let n be the number of transforms and P be the set of valid
patches. The number of queries is then bounded by O(n · |P|).
In the worst case, we make two full passes over each patch
(once for heatmap estimation and once in reduction), plus at
most log |P| queries for a binary search. The algorithm in full
is presented in Algorithm 1.
An example output and algorithm flow for the mask gener-
ation phase is in Fig. 3. The resulting image after this phase
consists of the victim image outside the generated mask M
and the target image inside the mask, i.e., the resulting image
at this stage is x+M · (xtar − x).
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm to generate mask. Compute
heatmap estimate of each patch in the object, sort patches,
greedily remove patches that improve the score function
J , which tries to minimize number of pixels in mask,
minimize sparsity, and minimize error. Value for λ1 is
found through hypertuning.
Input : x, xtar, yadv
Output: M with lowest mask score J(M, δ, slo)
1 Function J(M , δ, slo):
2 if S(M, δ) < slo then
3 return ∞
4 return λ1 · ||M ||0 +
(
1− S(M,xtar − x))
5
6 Function GenMask(x, xtar, slo, shi):
7 P ← Set of all patches
8 M ← Mask covering the whole object
9 // HEATMAP ESTIMATION
10 for ρ in P do
11 sρ ← S(M − ρ, xtar − x)
12 end
13 Sort P from highest sρ to lowest
14 // COARSE REDUCTION
15 i← Binary search for highest index such that
S(M∗, xtar − x) >= shi, where M∗ is the bitwise
union of all patches ρi to ρ|P|
16 M ←M∗
17 // FINE REDUCTION
18 for ρ in P do
19 if J(M − ρ, xtar − x, slo) < J(M,xtar − x, slo)
then
20 M ←M − ρ
21 end
22 end
23 return M
B. Perturbation Generation (Survivability Boosting)
Given a resulting image x and a mask M from the previous
stage, survivability boosting, or simply boosting, aims to find
the perturbation δ to add to x to create a targeted adversar-
ial example for class yadv that can survive physical-world
transformations with the highest probability (see Equation 10).
By directly optimizing over survivability with respect to the
target label, we aim to create robust physical attacks that
are constrained to a perturbation space defined by the mask
M . Survivability also gives us a function whose gradient we
can estimate. We use the Randomized Gradient Free (RGF)
method [24], [25] to find maximally robust perturbations.
Our perturbation generation process has several crucial
differences from OPT-style attacks [18]. The first is that we
have a survivability based re-formulation instead of a distance
based re-formulation. We use the initial target example xtar
to initialize the noise and then begin maximizing survivability,
whereas OPT-attack interpolates between victim and target
to find the boundary, and then effectively searches near the
Algorithm 2: Algorithm to generate perturbations for
a given mask. Goal is to attack victim image x to be
classified as target yadv with the use of example target
image xtar, mask M . Hyper-parameter values given in
Section VI-A.
Input : x, xtar, M , b, q, β, η
Output: δ with highest survivability
1 δ ← xt − xv
2 s← S(M, δ)
3 while num queries + iteration cost ≤ b do
4 # Estimate Gradient
5 for i = 1 . . . q do
6 ui ← random, normally distributed vector of
dimension |M |
7 si ← S(M, δ + β · ui)
8 gˆi =
si−s
β · ui
9 end
10 gˆ = Average of gˆi values
11 # Update
12 δ ← δ − η · gˆ
13 s← S(M, δ)
14 end
15 return δ with highest s
boundary to find closer points to the victim. We do not need
to find such a boundary or search around the boundary.
Another key difference is that OPT-attack requires frequent
calculations of the boundary distance, which is calculated
through binary search and is query-intensive. Our survivability
metric is computed directly on the n transformation samples
and does not require binary searching to estimate a boundary
distance.
Once δ has been initialized M · (xtar − x), we proceed
to maximize the probability that a perturbation will remain
robust to physical-world transforms with the RGF [24], [25]
method for gradient estimation using q random samples for
each gradient estimation. Explicitly, let u be random Gaussian
unit vectors within the allowable range of the mask. Then, the
gradient update is as follows:
gˆ =
S(M, δ + βu)− S(M, δ)
β
· u (12)
To ensure query efficiency, we also impose a query budget
b on the boosting stage. The complete algorithm is presented
in Algorithm 2.
C. Theoretical Analysis
GRAPHITE has two main sources of error that can affect
the perturbation quality: (a) Sampling error: we sample a set
of transformations to estimate a solution to Equation (10) and
(b) GFO error: in the hard label setting, the attacker does
not have access to gradient information. GRAPHITE uses
gradient-free optimization that samples a range of random
Gaussian vectors leading to errors in gradient estimation. In
7
this section, we provide an analysis of these two errors. We
first show that solving the approximation approaches the true
solution given enough sampled transformations implying that
sampling introduces a very low error in the optimum with high
probability. Second, for a fixed error in perturbation value,
the number of boosting iterations (Sec. V-B) that GRAPHITE
needs is proportional to the Lipschitz constant of the objective
function. Section V-C3 contains experimental results showing
that our objective has a low Lipschitz constant without big
jumps.
1) Sampling Error Bounds: Let δ1 be the solution to (10)
and δ2 be the solution to version estimated over n samples.
Then we have the following:
With probability at least 1 − 2e−nq
3
32 we have that
| G(δ1) − G′(δ2) |< , where G and G′ is the
function being optimized in (10) and a version
of (10) approximated with n transforms respectively.
With the requisite choice of n and  we can make the
probability 1− 2e−nq
3
32 very close to one. Intuitively, it means
that with high probability sampling introduces a very small
error in the value of the optimum. We provide a complete
proof for the statement mentioned above in Appendix B.
2) GFO Error: We give some background on gradient-
free optimization (GFO). For details we refer to [24]. Let
f : E → < be a function, where E = <n. Define its Gaussian
approximation fµ(x) as follows:
fµ(x) =
∫
E
f(x+ µu)pN (u)du (13)
Where pN (u) is the probability-density function (pdf) a n-
dimensional multi-variate Gaussian N (0,Σ). In GFO, one
replaces the gradient of f in the descent procedure to find
the optimum of gµ(x) as follows: pick u distributed according
N (0,Σ) and define it as:
f(x+ µu)− f(x)
µ
· Σ−1 · u (14)
In other words we take a directional derivative in the
direction of a random Gaussian. Note that the derivative can
be evaluated by black-box queries on f . Further note that the
function we are optimizing is not convex and also might not
be differentiable, so we are in the second case of [24, Section
7]. Essentially the number of iterations needed to achieve a
certain error is proportional to the Lipschitz constant of the
function f .
3) Lipschitz constants: To demonstrate that our object has
a low local Lipschitz constant, we execute boosting on an ex-
ample stop sign to speed limit 30 km/hr attack with n = 1000
transformations and approximate the local Lipschitz constant
every time we compute S(M, δ + β · u). The approximate
local Lipschitz constant is given by |S(M,δ+β·u)−S(δ)|||β·u|| . We
found that the maximum observed local Lipschitz constant
was 0.0537. Figure 5 shows a histogram of observed local
Lipschitz constant, and we can see the majority of these values
are very low. From the previous section it is clear that low local
Lipschitz constants lead to better convergence.
Fig. 5: This figures shows a histogram of our approximate local
Lipschitz constant observations on survivability. The constants
are binned in intervals of 0.005 with the label being the right
side of the interval. This graph shows that survivability does
not vary too much per amount of change.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
We demonstrate the viability of GRAPHITE by attacking a
traffic sign classifier trained on German Traffic Sign Recogni-
tion Benchmark (GTSRB) [28] data. We show that our results
are robust to physical world transforms. We do this by both
reporting digital survivability results on a broader range of
attacks and a subset of physical survivability results to confirm
that our digitally robust examples translate to the physical
world in the form of stickers. We also show results in a drive-
by setting, similar to Eykholt et al. [15].
A. Experimental Setup
Datasets and Classifiers. We use the classifier from RP2 [15],
[29] trained on an augmented GTSRB dataset [28]. Similar
to RP2 [15], we replace the German stop signs with U.S.
stop signs from the LISA dataset [30]. As a validation set,
we take out the last 10% from each class in the training set.
We also augment the dataset with random rotation, translation,
and shear, following Eykholt et al. [15]. Our network, GTSRB-
Net, has a 97.656% accuracy on the test set.
In both attacks, we use our own victim image of the
source object and use an Internet image outside of the dataset
for initialization to demonstrate that GRAPHITE does not
rely on having training set images to initialize from. In our
experiments we assume that object boundaries are available,
but note they could be obtained automatically through an
object segmentation network [31].
Hyper-parameters. We set β = 1, η = 500, and the query
budget b to 20k. In both approaches, we test over n = 100
transformations and take q = 10 gradient samples. Once we
have a final attack, we re-evaluate the survivability over n =
1000 transforms to get a better estimate of how well it will
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perform. In practice, the difference between survivability on
100 vs. 1000 transformations was often within 3%.
For transformations, we model rotation about the y axis
with homography matrices, lighting changes with gamma
correction, and focus changes with Gaussian blurring. For our
GTSRB [28] attack we set rotation about the y axis to be
between −50° and 50° and fix the base focal length f = 3 ft.
The projected image plane distance is allowed to vary between
f and 15 ft. Crop sizes and offsets can vary between 0% and
3.125%. The max γ effect can be 3.5 for darkening (or 13.5 for
lightening), and use Gaussian kernels of size 1, 5, and 9. All
parameters are sampled uniformly. We discuss in more detail
our process of doing transformations in Appendix C.
B. Digital Survivability Tests
We report a subset of results when run with a high threshold
shi = 90% for coarse-grained mask reduction and a low
threshold slo = 70% for fine-grained mask reduction. We note
that a higher shi helps ensure that the coarse-grained reducer
does not remove useful patches while a higher slo increases
the odds that the final boosted survivability is higher, as it
provides a better starting point. We note that these parameters
can be tuned based on the specific victim target pairs and to
tradeoff more subtle noise and survivability, which we discuss
further in Section VII.
In this section, we generate attacks with n = 100 trans-
formations during the attack and then calculate the final
survivability on n = 1000 transformations. A sample of results
are shown in Table I. We show that we can attack with a
variety of victim and target pairs and achieve greater than
75% survivability, with often 10% or less of the original object
perturbed.
Fig. 6 shows the trends of survivability and number of
pixels over time as the algorithm runs where the victim image
is a stop sign and the target is a speed limit 30 km/hr
sign. Generally speaking, the survivability drops some as we
generate a mask and then once we have a mask we boost the
survivability up with gradient-free optimization. We noticed an
unexpected drop in survivability around 475 seconds as the
algorithm was transitioning from the reduce phase to boost
phase. It turned out that this was due to statistical estimation
of survivability over 100 random transforms. The boost phase
made its own estimate of initial survivability, which turned
out to be slightly lower than the survivability estimated by the
reduce phase. This variance is one reason why we estimate the
final survivability in our experiments using 1000 transforms.
We additionally present an ablative study over different
reduction strategies in mask generation to enforce a specific
minimum survivability threshold. The results are shown in
Table II. For these results we attack a stop sign to become
a speed limit 30 km/hr sign under three settings: the full
mask generation pipeline, only reducing the mask in a coarse-
grained manner, and only reducing the mask in a fine-grained
manner. The minimum threshold is 70%.
These results show that both reduction processes have
benefit. While using only fine-grained reduction yields similar
Fig. 6: The above plot shows the three phases of the algorithm.
The plot starts near time 286 because it takes approximately
286 seconds to build up a heatmap. The binary search stage
is very quick and reduces the number of pixels in the mask
from 702 to 215 with a survivability of 90%. Over the next 113
seconds, the reduce stage further reduces the number of bits
in the mask to 70 bits and estimated survivability to 76%. The
boost stage starts at approximately 475 seconds. It boosts the
survivability to 93% while keeping the same number of bits.
further reduces the number of bits to 70 with a survivability
of 70%.
survivability and mask size results to the full algorithm, it uses
almost 10k more queries and takes some more time. When
only using coarse grained reduction, many more pixels are
included to reach the same minimum 70% threshold, and thus
these masks are much larger.
C. Physical Robustness Lab Tests
The findings by Athalye et al. [14] and Eykholt et al. [15]
suggest that digital survivability can be a good proxy for
physical survivability. We carried out physical object pertur-
bation experiments in the field and generally confirmed those
findings. We evaluate GRAPHITE on a targeted attack with a
victim image of a stop sign with a target label of speed limit
30 km/hr at different viewing angles and lighting conditions.
We set the size of our original image to be 244×244
and used 100 randomly chosen transformations in the attack.
During the attack, we first generate noise in 32×32 and then
upsample to the resolution of the input image whenever they
have to be added together.
1) GTSRB Setup: We classify our objects at stationary
positions to test how robust our attacks are to different viewing
conditions. To examine robustness against geometric changes,
we take five pictures of the perturbed stop sign at 14 different
locations for a total of 70 pictures. To compare against baseline
stop sign accuracy, we also take five pictures of a clean
stop sign at each of the same 14 locations. The 14 locations
where chosen based on RP2 evaluation [15]. To test lighting
conditions, we take one set of images in sunny mid-day
conditions and one in the evening with less direct sunlight.
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TABLE I: Sample of digital targeted attacks on GTSRB-Net. Ran with slo = 70%, shi = 90%, n = 100 during attack. Final
survivability calculated on n = 1000 transformations.
Target
Victim
Final Survivability 79% 78.7% 84.3% 90%
Mask Pixels 35 75 55 70
Mask to Object Size Ratio 4.99% 10.68% 7.83% 9.97%
Survivability 98.1% 95.4% 97.1% 100%
Mask Bits 15 143 63 0
Mask to Object Size Ratio 2.26% 21.54% 9.49% 0%
TABLE II: Ablative study of reduction types. We present
final survivability and pixel counts. Attack is stop sign to speed
limit 30 km/hr. Full algorithm uses slo = 70% and shi = 90%,
only fine reduction uses slo = 70%, and only coarse reduction
uses shi = 70%
Final
survivability
n = 1000
Final
number
of pixels
Queries Run time
Only Fine
Reduction 89.3% 68 131.9k 541.6s
Only
Coarse
Reduction
89.6% 159 96.0k 397.3s
Full
Algorithm 90% 70 123.7k 518.7s
To gather crops we use a YOLOv3 [32] object detector
network trained on MS COCO [33] to predict bounding boxes
for the stop sign. We take the output bounding boxes, crop the
sign accordingly, resize to 32 × 32, and send to our network
for classification.
We generated an example attack that took approximately
9 mins with a boost budget of 20k queries. In total with
mask generation, it used 123.7k queries. It modeled 100
transformations and digitally survived 93% of those transfor-
mations by the end. When confirming survivability on 1000
transformations, the attack survived 90% of transformations.
2) GTSRB Results: Table III shows the results of the lab
tests for our test perturbation, and Table IV shows a subset of
images used in the test. We include the percentage of images
labeled as speed limit 30 km/hr, the average speed limit 30
km/hr confidence on successes and failures, the average stop
confidence over all of the images, and the baseline stop sign
results.
Overall, 92.86% of the 140 total images (one set of five at
each location mid-day and another set in the evening) were
classified as speed limit 30 km/hr. There was not too much
variation across either lighting changes or geometric changes,
with all spots yielding a successful attack image at least 80%
of the time and with little difference between mid-day and
evening photos (94.29% vs 91.43%). These results suggest that
our perturbations are robust to environmental changes captured
by viewing perspectives and lighting. The average confidence
is above 85% as well and we confirmed that the speed limit
30 km/hr classifications are due to our stickers, as 100% of
baseline images of clean stop signs were correctly classified
as a stop sign.
D. Drive-by
1) Drive-by Test setup: Boosting can be used alone on a
pre-selected mask. We did a drive-by test using a pre-selected
mask and then boosting it as in this paper. To evaluate our
attack in a driving scenario, similar to Eykholt et al. [15] we
record videos of us driving up to the stop sign with a mounted
smartphone camera in an empty parking lot. We found 98%
of every 10th frames analyzed to be classified as 30 km/hr. In
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TABLE III: Lab results of targeted attack (stop sign to speed limit 30 km / hr) on GTSRB-Net under different angles and
distances compared against a baseline of clean stop signs. 5 pictures taken at each angle / distance pair listed at mid-day and
5 pictures taken at each angle / distance pair at evening.
Distance /
Angle
SL 30 Success
(%)
Avg. SL 30
Conf. on
Successes
Avg. SL 30
Conf. on
Failures
Avg. Stop Conf. Baseline StopSuccess (%)
5’ 0° 100% 0.993335 – 0.000247 100%
5’ 15° 100% 0.976236 – 0.001119 100%
5’ 30° 100% 0.946215 – 0.001646 100%
5’ 45° 100% 0.45445 – 0.065648 100%
10’ 0° 100% 0.997888 – 0.000366223 100%
10’ 15° 100% 0.898794 – 0.0414612 100%
10’ 30° 90% 0.885375 0.171763 0.123489 100%
15’ 0° 90% 0.861517 0.125965 0.0656558 100%
15’ 15° 80% 0.800151 0.0727495 0.157176 100%
20’ 0° 80% 0.8663294 0.131629 0.0487754 100%
20’ 15° 100% 0.892987 – 0.0052069 100%
25’ 0° 90% 0.854974 0.07634 0.00744433 100%
30’ 0° 90% 0.946917 0.129826 0.00397451 100%
40’ 0° 80% 0.777677 0.0996577 0.0720889 100%
Aggregate
(day) 94.29% 0.853619 0.219418 0.0535812 100%
Aggregate
(evening) 91.43% 0.886951 0.191157 0.0313188 100%
Aggregate
(total) 92.86% 0.870285 0.205288 0.04245 100%
TABLE IV: Sample of lab-test images of targeted attack (stop sign to speed limit 30 km / hr) on GTSRB-Net.
Distance / Angle Image Distance / Angle Image Distance / Angle Image
5’ 0° 10’ 15° 20’ 15°
5’ 15° 10’ 30° 25’ 0°
5’ 30° 15’ 0° 30’ 0°
5’ 45° 15’ 15° 40’ 0°
10’ 0° 20’ 0°
11
Fig. 7: Stop sign to speed limit 30 km/hr drive-by images
contrast, without perturbation applied, the classifier correctly
classified the stop sign in all the frames. The adversarial patch
applied to a physical stop sign in our tests is shown in Figure 7.
This drive-by test was done pre-Covid-19 and before the mask
generation algorithm was in place. Later experiments with
GRAPHITE’s patches automatic mask generation were done
in one of the author’s backyard (Tables III and IV).
VII. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
Our mask generation process introduces the notion of a
scoring function, which gives the user valuable flexibility
to optimize their physical perturbations to fulfill different
objectives. For example, different weights could favor either
smaller masks or higher survivability. The score function can
also be used to impose constraints such as finding masks that
are smaller than some percent of the object area, or requiring
that the starting survivability be at least some percent. The
objective could also be adaptively applied. We posit that our
default score function is useful for most cases and provide it
as a way to automate attacks, but our approach lends some
flexibility for fine-tuning on specific cases.
We found that good thresholds slo and shi can be different
across varied attack pairs. This means that for optimal results
some tuning of these parameters could required. As an ex-
ample, the 30 km/hr to yield to passenger (Table I) patch
has 143 bits and 95.4% digital survivability. Changing slo
to 0.5 results in a smaller 114-pixel perturbation with 94%
survivability. This is not entirely unexpected since this is a
joint-optimization problem and multiple solutions will exist
depend on the weights assigned to different objectives.
One limitation in our work is that our transforms currently
simulate viewpoint changes to 2D objects such as flat traf-
fic signs (see Appendix C for description of our transform
models). GRAPHITE’s approach is however agnostic to the
transforms model. Fundamentally, we just require access to
a set of transforms from which we can sample to estimate
survivability. Furthermore, the transforms do not have to be
differentiable, because we are in the hard-label setting.
One limitation in hard-label attacks is that the starting point
has to be a viable solution. Else, there is a risk of getting
stuck in a valley with no viable solutions nearby to allow
climbing out of the valley. In an earlier version of GRAPHITE,
(a) McAfee’s manually-crafted
attack that caused a Tesla to
see a 35 miles/hr sign as 85
miles/hr [34]
(b) GRAPHITE-generated im-
age for making a 30 km/hr sign
appear as a 80 km/hr sign. The
above result had 64% digital
survivability.
Fig. 8: An attack discovered by McAfee researchers manually
and a similar attack discovered by GRAPHITE automatically
we did not have an automatic mask generation algorithm and
were crafting candidate masks by hand. We often ran into
situations where patches based on our hand-crafted mask had
zero survivability and failed to successfully boost. We found
that GRAPHITE significantly alleviates this problem since it
starts with a large patch, which is usually survivable, and then
reduces and boosts it.
We were curious if GRAPHITE could have been useful
in finding a recent widely-reported attack by McAfee re-
searchers [34] that caused a 35 speed limit sign to appear
to be a 85 speed limit sign to a Tesla. The attack involved
placing black tapes on the 35 speed limit sign (see Figure 8a).
Since we were working with the GTSRB dataset that does not
contain US signs, we decided to try an attack from 30 km/hr
to 80 km/hr sign. GRAPHITE discovered a similar attack
using GRAPHITE by tuning the objective function h(M) to
favor smaller masks during the fine-grained reduce as long
as survivability remained positive (see Fig. 8b). Arguably, the
attacks could confuse a human as well, but an auto company
researcher has mentioned to us that testing against such attacks
is of concern to them.
Finally, we note that we used the number of transforms n
to be 100 in our experiments. Using smaller values of n allow
adversarial attacks to be generated faster, but the examples
may have poorer survivability under a larger number of
transforms. For instance, for the stop sign to 30 km/hr attack,
for n = 5, GRAPHITE generated adversarial examples with
65 pixels but only 54% digital survivability with only 7115
queries. This compares with 123.7k queries and 90% digital
survivability for n = 100 for the same hyper-parameters. OPT
required 33,396 queries for generating the digital-only attack
in Fig. 2c. We thus consider GRAPHITE to be relatively
query-efficient considering that queries in GRAPHITE also
require estimating survivability over multiple samples.
In principle, since GRAPHITE is automated, it can be
used as part of an adversarial defense pipeline. However, the
algorithm can take a few minutes to produce an attack image.
To achieve speedups, a white-box version of GRAPHITE and
speeding up heatmap generation would be useful. Determining
if a significantly smaller number of transforms suffice in
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generating robust attacks and defenses would be a useful future
research direction as well.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Physical attacks on computer vision. All existing work for
robust physical perturbation attacks on computer vision are
in the white-box setting. Examples include printing images of
perturbed objects [35], modifying objects with stickers [15],
[16], and 3D printing perturbed objects [14]. But, all these
methods rely on the availability of gradients from a white-box
model to find perturbations that have high survivability under a
range of physical transforms such as change of viewing angle,
distance, and lighting. To the best of our knowledge, our work
is the first to demonstrate robust and query-efficient physical
attacks using only top-1 hard-label information.
Furthermore, GRAPHITE, as far as we are aware, is the first
to provide an automated method to both generate a small mask
and find a robust adversarial example over transforms. Eykholt
et al. [15] came closest to that in whitebox settings, suggesting
possible ways to identify sensitive areas in an image, but in
the end, did not provide an automated method to generate a
good mask.
Our work take inspiration from transformation techniques
in [15]. We express physical transformations using classi-
cal computer vision techniques. For example, we model all
geometric transformations (e.g., translation, rotation) using
a homography matrix and model lighting changes with a
radiometric transformation (see Appendix C).
Digital black-box attacks. There are several categories of
digital black-box attacks:
• Substitute nets: These transferability techniques train
a surrogate model, generate white-box examples on the
surrogate, and hope they transfer to the target [36]. Un-
fortunately, targeted example success rates are low [37].
Additionally, these techniques require access to multiple
similar training sets that may not be available. By con-
trast, our work only requires query access to the target
model.
• Gradient estimation: These score-based techniques re-
quire access to the softmax layer output in addition to
class labels [21], [22]. Using this information, they can
apply zeroth order optimization or local search strategies
to compute the adversarial example. By contrast, our
threat model only allows the attacker top-1 predicted class
label access. We construct a gradient-free optimization
objective that can create robust examples using only hard-
label access.
• Decision attacks: A recent line of work has started
exploring hard-label attacks in the digital setting [18],
[19], [20], [23]. Unfortunately, directly applying physical
attack principles from digital settings does not efficiently
yield robust adversarial examples that can be used to
modify real-world objects (see Section II-F) because the
optimization objective is different. For instance, the per-
turbation magnitude of pixels in digital examples should
be low because the perturbation is added to the entire im-
age and attacks are designed to be imperceptible. By con-
trast, physical perturbation attacks are less concerned with
magnitude and imperceptibility because a perturbation is
added to a small region and not the entire object and relies
on humans ignoring them. Additionally, decision-based
attacks focus on minimizing decision boundary distance
and thus attempt to estimate this accurately using queries
to the target model. By contrast, physical attacks require
survivability against a range of environmental conditions,
resulting in changes to the optimization goals. Our work
relies on the unique properties of physical adversarial
examples, and shows how we can adapt gradient-free
optimization to obtain a query-efficient and robust attack.
Black-box physical attacks on audio. There is recent work
in the audio domain, and specifically automatic speech recog-
nition (ASR) systems, that uses the threat model of black-
box physical attacks [38], [39], [40]. One such approach
is based on mangling voice commands based on reverse
engineering MFCC features [38], [39], which is specific to
the ASR domain. Other approaches build upon the transfer-
ability principle [40], where the attacker trains a surrogate
model, performs white-box attacks on that model, and then
hopes that the attacks transfer to the target. As discussed
earlier, our approach does not require a dataset or training
a surrogate model; furthermore, adversarial examples based
on transferability do not always transfer to the target model,
especially when conducting targeted attacks [21], [22]. In
contrast, our work is robust on targeted examples and requires
only the model’s top-1 predicted label without needing to
train a surrogate model. Additionally, robust physical audio
adversarial examples with low sound distortion appear to still
be an open challenge in the white-box setting [41]. By contrast,
our work builds a structured approach in the more established
area of vision adversarial examples where white-box attacks
are already physically robust [14], [15], [17] and adapt to the
black-box setting.
IX. CONCLUSION
We developed GRAPHITE, first automatic algorithm that
can create candidates for robust physical perturbation attacks
with small masks. GRAPHITE is designed for hard-label
black-box setting where adversary has only access to top-
1 labels from querying a model. We present a formulation
of the objective as a joint optimization problem that aims to
find small masks and robust perturbations within those masks.
We discuss why the problem is computationally difficult to
solve and then present a two-stage optimization process. We
present algorithms to first generate masks and then optimize
the perturbations for survivability. We show that GRAPHITE
produces robust results that can be physically realized: attack-
ing a physical stop sign with stickers generated by GRAPHITE
causes a high-accuracy model to output speed limit 30 km/hr
in 92.86% of lab tests with high confidence.
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APPENDIX A
NP-COMPLETENESS OF MASK GENERATION
A n×n square grid is represented as Gn, which is a graph
(Vn, En) (Vn has vertices (i, j), where 0 ≤ i ≤ n and 0 ≤ j ≤
n and for each (i, j), {(i, j+1), (i, j−1), (i+1, j), (i−1, j)}∩
Vn is in the set of edges En). A mask M is a sub-graph of the
grid Gn that corresponds to a contiguous region of squares. Let
C(Gn) be the set of masks corresponding to the grid Gn. Let
µ : C(Gn)→ <+ be a monotonic scoring function (M ⊆M ′
implies that µ(M) ≤ µ(M ′)). The mask generation problem
can be stated as follows: Given r and threshold t, find a mask
M of size ≤ r (the size of the mask is number of squares in it)
such that µ(M) ≥ t. We call this problem MASKP (n, µ, r, t).
Simply enumerating masks is not feasible because the
number of masks could be exponential. We provide a simple
argument. Consider a k×k sub-grid of Gn. Consider columns
that are odd numbered (i.e. of the form (i, ?), where i is odd).
Now any choice of one square for the even columns gives us
a contiguous mask, so there are ≥ 2 k(k+1)2 masks. There are
(n− k)2 k × k sub-grids in Gn. So a lower bound on masks
of size k is at least (n − k)22 k(k+1)2 . Next we prove that our
problem is actually NP-complete.
The Set Cover. Given a universe U and a family S of subsets
of U , a cover is a subfamily C ⊆ P(U) of sets whose union is
U . In the set-covering decision problem, the input is a triple
(U ,S, k) (k is an integer), and the question is whether there is
a set covering of size k or less. In the set covering optimization
problem, the input is a pair (U ,S) and the task is to find a set
covering that uses the fewest sets. The set-covering decision
problem is known to be NP-complete.
Theorem 1: Problem MASKP is NP-complete.
Proof. Our reduction will be from the decision set-cover
problem. Assume we are given an instance of the set-cover
problem (U ,S, k). Let n = max(|U|, |S|). We create a n× n
grid Gn. Let C(Gn) be the set of masks of Gn. We construct
a scoring function µ as follows: Let M be a mask. Let
I = {i|(i, 0) ∈ M}, and SI = {Sj |j ∈ I ∧ Sj ∈ SI}.
µ(M) = 1 if and only if the following condition holds
(otherwise µ(M) = 0): |I| ≤ k and ∪j∈I = Sj = U . It is
easy to see that MASKP (n, µ, n2, 1) has a satisfying solution
iff the instance of the set cover problem has a solution. This
proves that the problem is NP-hard. Given a solution to the
problem MASKP (n, µ, r, t), it is easy to check that it is a valid
solution in polynomial time, so the problem is NP. Therefore,
MASKP (n, µ, r, t) is NP-complete. 2
APPENDIX B
SAMPLING ERROR
There are several versions of Chernoff’s bounds [42]. We
state in Theorem 1 a form that is most convenient for us.
Theorem 1:
Let X1, · · · , Xn be iid binary variables such that P (Xi =
1) = p (thus P (Xi = 0) = 1 − p), and let A =
∑n
i=1Xi. In
this case, we have the following inequality:
P (| A
n
− p |≥ ζp) ≤ 2e−npζ
2
3 (15)
Consider the probability inside (10), which we denote as q.
Let us sample n transformations {t1, · · · , tn} from distribution
T . Let Xi be equal to 1 if F (t(x + M · δ) 6= yadv), and
0 otherwise. By definition P (Xi = 1) is equal to q. By
Theorem 1 we have that (we instantiate the theorem with
 = ζq and A =
∑n
i=1Xi), where  represents the error in
our solution due to sampling.
P (| A
n
− q |≥ ) ≤ 2e−nq
3
32 (16)
Or in other words
P (| A
n
− q |< ) ≥ 1− 2e−nq
3
32 (17)
APPENDIX C
MODELING PHYSICAL TRANSFORMS USING CLASSICAL
COMPUTER VISION
Prior work by Eykholt et al. [15] and Athalye et al. [14]
model environmental effects to create physical-world attacks
in the white-box setting. These transformations account for
varying conditions such as the distance and angle of the
camera, lighting conditions, etc. Based on this work, we
build a more principled set of transformations using classical
computer vision techniques. To this end, we group these effects
into 3 main classes of transformations:
1) Geometric transformations: These transformations re-
fer to shape-based changes including rotation, translation
and zoom. For planar objects, all three effects can be
captured in a single perspective transformation through
a homography matrix. Homography matrices relate two
planar views under different perspectives.
Geometrically, to convert points from one image plane to
another, one can break down the operation into a rotation
and translation matrix R, perspective projection onto a
plane (P), and an affine transformation from plane to
pixels (A). In the planar case, this boils down to a 3 x
3 homography matrix H:
xout = APRxin = Hxin (18)
We use these homographies to simulate rotation around
the y axis and different viewing distances for given
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ranges of values. Once we pick values for each of
the parameters uniformly, we construct the homography
matrix to compute the transformation.
After performing the perspective transform, we random
crop to the tightest square crop that includes the whole
object ±c% of the resultant image size to adjust for
cropping errors. We also add random offsets for the
crop, given as two more parameters. Then, we resize
the square to the original resolution.
2) Radiometric transformations: These are appearance-
based transformations with effects such as lighting-based
changes. One technique to perform brightness adjust-
ments is gamma correction, which applies a nonlinear
function. Separately, printers apply nonlinear functions
to their colorspaces as well. Gamma correction is reflec-
tive of nonlinear human sight perception. To model these
radiometric-based changes, we model gamma correction
under gamma values between 1γ and γ, with half coming
from [ 1γ , 1] and half coming from [1, γ] in expectation
where γ is the maximum gamma value allowed. Assum-
ing the image ranges from [0, 1], this is defined as the
following:
xout = x
γ
in (19)
3) Filtering transformations: These transformations
model changes related to the camera focus. We model
Gaussian blurring of different kernel sizes to measure
the effects of the target object being out-of-focus. We
note that as a side benefit, this may help deal with
printer error as some precision in color values is lost in
printing.
We define a single transformation to be a composite function
that includes one of each type of modeled transformation.
In our case with those listed above, we would have a per-
spective transform followed by a cropping operation, gamma
correction, and a Gaussian blur convolution. Examples of
transformed images are shown in Figure 9.
Fig. 9: Examples of different transformed images. The upper-
left image is the original, and the rest are three examples of
transformed versions with perspective, lighting, and blurring
transforms.
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